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Monetary policy in small open economies is typically cast as a choice
between an exchange rate anchor (fixed or predetermined exchange
rates) and a money anchor (floating exchange rates). Under such re-
gimes, the growth rate of the nominal anchor is set according to the
desired long-run inflation rate. After undergoing a not necessarily
painless adjustment process, the economy would eventually reach
the long-run inflation rate.
In practice, however, policymakers have certainly not restricted
themselves to such a limited menu of policy instruments. Pure floating
rates are, at best, rare, as policymakers typically intervene in foreign
exchange markets to smooth exchange rate fluctuations or achieve some
international reserves target. While predetermined exchange rates are
more common, it is still the case that, more often than not, policymak-
ers adjust the devaluation rate in response to changes in the domestic
and external environment or engage in real exchange rate targeting.1
At an even more fundamental level, policymakers increasingly
view short-term nominal interest rates as the main nominal anchor.
In developed countries, short-term interest rates are, by and large,
the most common policy instrument (see Batten and others, 1990). The
most prominent example is, of course, the United States: the Federal
Reserve conducts monetary policy by setting the federal funds rate (the
interest rate at which commercial banks borrow overnight). When
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inflation raises its ugly head, the Federal Reserve engages in a grad-
ual tightening of monetary policy by raising the federal funds rate.
In developing countries, short-term interest rates have also
played a key role in the conduct of monetary policy. In the mid-
1980s, for instance, countries such as Argentina and Brazil sup-
ported repeated stabilization attempts by hiking interest rates on
short-term government debt to increase demand for domestic as-
sets and thus prevent speculative attacks against the domestic
currency (see Calvo and Végh, 1995). In the case of Mexico, ana-
lysts point to the monetary authorities’ reluctance to raise inter-
est rates as a key factor in triggering the December 1994 crisis. In
the wake of Thailand’s decision to abandon its fixed exchange rate
system in July 1997, Brazil and Hong Kong repeatedly raised in-
terest rates to thwart currency speculators.
With the advent of indexed government debt, some countries—Chile
being the most notable example—have actually used the interest rate
on such instruments (that is, a real interest rate) as the main policy
instrument (see, for example, Corbo and Fischer, 1994). Even when
policymakers do not set a real interest rate, a real interest rate target
seems to be very much on their minds. Reinhart (1993), for instance,
argues that the Federal Reserve may be viewed as aiming at setting a
real interest rate that is consistent with full-employment output. In
fact, the level of the federal funds rate in real terms is often an impor-
tant consideration in whether to raise further interest rates.
In practice, the use of interest rates as the main policy instru-
ment has often taken place in conjunction with some inflation target.
In other words, policymakers set an inflation target—explicitly or
implicitly—and change interest rates with the aim of achieving such a
target. When inflation targets are explicitly announced, such policies
have been referred to as inflation targeting (see Leiderman and Svens-
son, 1995; Masson, Savastano, and Sharma, 1997). Inflation targeting
has been implemented in industrial countries such as Australia, Can-
ada, Finland, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Although, in principle, a myriad of policy instruments could be used to
achieve a given inflation target, in practice short-term interest rates
have served as the main policy instrument. Hence, the most common
manifestation of inflation targeting appears to be an inflation target
accompanied by some explicit or implicit interest rate rule that is de-
signed so as to achieve the target. Among developing countries, Chile
seems to come the closest to using an inflation targeting scheme (see
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At an analytical level, the use of nominal interest rates as a
policy instrument has raised some important questions regarding
its impact on prices and inflation. Nominal interest rate targeting
may lead to an indeterminate price level under flexible prices (Sar-
gent and Wallace, 1975) or indeterminate inflation rate under sticky
prices (Calvo, 1983). Indeterminacy problems can be avoided by
explicitly introducing a government budget constraint (Auernhe-
imer and Contreras, 1993); by designing appropriate interest rate
rules (see, for instance, Reinhart, 1992); or by letting policymak-
ers set the interest rate on liquid bonds issued by the government
(Calvo and Végh, 1995, 1996). Policy rules that rely on real inter-
est rates may also easily lead to various indeterminacies (Rein-
hart, 1993). The use of the real interest rate as a policy instrument
has received particular attention in the case of Chile (see, for ex-
ample, Rojas, 1993; Corbo and Fischer, 1994; Mendoza and Fernán-
dez, 1994). Although some important insights have followed from
this large literature, the profession is still far from reaching any
sort of consensus on the comparative advantages of different in-
struments and policy rules.
This paper starts from the premise that in order to assess
different policy rules, it is useful to establish some basic equiva-
lences among policy rules. Equivalent policy rules are defined as
rules that yield exactly the same dynamics in response to, say, a
long-term reduction in the inflation rate. In a formal sense, find-
ing equivalent policy rules is a trivial exercise. Consider the exer-
cise of a permanent reduction in the rate of monetary growth in a
closed-economy model. This exercise will generate as an outcome
some equilibrium path for the nominal interest rate. Clearly, if
policymakers could announce a credible inflation target (which
would anchor the long-run inflation rate) and set that same path
for the nominal interest rate, the monetary growth rate would
endogenously fall on impact and remain at that lower level forev-
er. These two policy rules—the fixed money growth rule and the
interest rate rule—would therefore be equivalent.
In the real policy world, however, this formal equivalence will be
relevant only if the endogenous path of the nominal interest rate in
the fixed money growth rule is a linear function of observable vari-
ables, such as the deviation of the actual inflation rate from its long-
run steady state. In that case, an interest rate rule that sets the
interest rate according to the deviation of the actual inflation rate
from an inflation target would achieve the same results. Otherwise,
policymakers would not be able to implement the interest rate rule
that replicates the fixed money growth rule.154 Carlos Végh
This paper illustrates, in the context of a closed-economy model,
the existence of some basic equivalences among policy rules (that is,
policy rules that can be implemented in practice). Inflation is assumed
to be a predetermined variable, reflecting the highly inertial nature of
inflation in many countries with moderate inflation. The paper starts
by comparing the use of a money anchor, a nominal interest rate an-
chor, and a real interest rate anchor, whereby policymakers set a fixed
level of the corresponding policy instrument (that is, there is no feed-
back mechanism). It is shown that only a money anchor (that is, a k-
percent money growth rule) yields a well-behaved system. A fixed lev-
el of either the nominal interest rate or the real interest rate leads to
unstable dynamics. This first result, which is here derived for the case
of sticky inflation, is thus in the spirit of the indeterminacies found in
the literature. In theory, then, there is no substitute for a k-percent
rule. In practice, however, there are well-known problems associated
with k-percent rules, such as the instability of monetary aggregates
and the choice of the appropriate monetary aggregate.
The paper then investigates the existence of simple interest rate
rules that could replicate the k-percent money growth rule. The follow-
ing rule is analyzed: let policymakers announce an inflation target and
then change the nominal interest rate according to the difference be-
tween the current inflation rate and the inflation target. Provided that
the inflation target is fully credible, such a policy generates the same
qualitative dynamic adjustment as the one delivered by the k-percent
money rule. In fact, a simple case is found (when real money demand is
of the Cagan type and thus has a constant interest rate semielasticity)
in which the inflation target-cum-interest rate rule exactly replicates
the k-percent money growth rule. In other words, the adjustment of
the economy to the announcement of a lower inflation target exactly
replicates the response of the economy to a lower rate of monetary
expansion. The paper then analyzes the following real interest rate
rule: let policymakers announce an inflation target and change the real
interest rate according to the difference between (a) the current infla-
tion rate and the inflation target and (b) deviations of output from its
full-employment level. Under a constant semielastic money demand,
this rules also replicates the k-percent money growth rule.
These three rules—the k-percent money rule, an inflation target-
cum-nominal interest rate rule, and an inflation target-cum-real in-
terest rate rule—are identical for a Cagan money demand. However,
as the analysis moves away from the more traditional instrument (a
monetary aggregate) toward less traditional ones (a nominal interest
rate and then a real interest rate), the feedback mechanisms multi-
ply and the policy regime becomes more complicated. This should155 Monetary Policy, Interest Rate Rules, and Inflation Targeting
prove a useful conceptual benchmark. In practice, this increased lev-
el of complexity would need to be weighted against whatever practi-
cal advantages may exist. For instance, setting a short-term nominal
interest rate may be operationally easier than setting a constant
growth of the money supply.
The three equivalent policy rules just mentioned imply an ad-
justment toward a lower long-run inflation rate that involves a
prolonged period of deflation (defined as inflation falling below its
long-run level during the adjustment process). This is needed for
real money balances to achieve a higher steady-state level. In prac-
tice, policymakers may want to avoid this deflationary period since
it essentially implies that the monetary policy stance is too tight.
As the analysis shows, policy rules that respond to the output gap
may prevent this deflationary period and ensure a monotonic fall
of the inflation rate toward its lower steady-state value. Under
certain conditions, these three policy rules deliver exactly the same
outcome: an inflation target combined with a money growth rule
that responds to the output gap; an inflation target combined with
a nominal interest rate rule that responds to both the inflation
gap and the output gap; and an inflation target combined with a
real interest rate rule that responds to both the inflation gap and
the output gap. It is still the case that the money growth rule is
the simplest of the three rules. But, again, a nominal interest rate
rule can achieve the same results without adding too much com-
plexity (since policymakers can easily monitor the inflation gap).
A final word of caution before proceeding to the formal analy-
sis. The equivalence results derived in this paper provide a useful
conceptual benchmark. No generality is claimed, however. Quite
to the contrary, the whole point of the exercise is to find condi-
tions (however strong) under which different policy rules are equiv-
alent. As is typical of applied economic theory (think, for example,
of the Ricardian equivalence or the Modigliani-Miller theorem),
the idea behind this analysis is that understanding admittedly ex-
treme cases in which such equivalences hold should then make it
easier to identify the main factors explaining deviations from the
benchmark in the real world. In this context, a model in which
some basic policy equivalence results hold should provide a useful
starting point for thinking about different monetary policy rules
and instruments. Put differently, the idea is to provide a useful
conceptual benchmark for thinking about these issues, rather than
to construct a model that replicates the real world.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 develops the basic model.
Sections 2, 3, and 4 analyze the use of the money supply, the nominal156 Carlos Végh
interest rate, and the real interest rate as policy instruments, respec-
tively. Section 5 derives the first equivalence proposition. Section 6
analyzes policy rules aimed at avoiding excessively tight monetary pol-
icy and derives the second equivalence proposition. Section 7 concludes.
1. THE MODEL
Consider a closed economy inhabited by a very large number of
identical consumers. Agents have perfect foresight. The Fischer equa-
tion holds, so that it = rt + t, where it is the nominal interest rate, rt is
the real interest rate, and t is the inflation rate.
1.1 Consumers
The lifetime utility of the representative consumer is given by
, (1)
where ct denotes consumption, (> 0) is the subjective discount
rate, and the function u(.) satisfies  ' v (.) > 0 and  ' ' v (.) < 0.
Consumers hold two assets: a bond (indexed to the price level
and in zero net supply in the aggregate) and money. Let at denote
the household’s financial wealth in real terms. Hence,
, (2)
where bt and mt denote the real stocks of bonds and money, respectively.
The bond earns a nominal return of it.
In this economy, trading is a costly activity in terms of resources.
Consumers hold money in order to reduce transactions costs. Trans-
actions costs are thus given by v(mt), where  ' v (m) < 0 and  ' ' v (m) > 0.2
The consumer’s flow constraint is given by
, (3)
where yt denotes the output of the good and t are lump-sum trans-
fers from the government.
 2. See Dornbusch and Frenkel (1973). Since transactions costs do not depend
on consumption, the derived real money demand will not depend on consumption,
either.
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The consumer chooses (ct, mt) for all t  [0, ) to maximize life-
time utility (equation 1), subject to equation 3, for given paths of rt,
yt, t, and it, and a given value of a0. The first-order conditions for this
standard optimal control program are the following:
, (4)
,   and (5)
, (6)
where t is the current value multiplier associated with constraint 3.
Equation 4 indicates that, at an optimum, the household equates the
marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of wealth. Equa-
tion 6 is the law of motion of the multiplier. Condition 5 states that,
at an optimum, the benefits derived from holding an additional unit
of real money balances will be equal to the corresponding opportuni-
ty cost. This equation implicitly defines a money demand function:
, (7)
where .
Differentiating equation 4 with respect to time and combining it
with equation 6 leads to the familiar Euler equation:
. (8)
Hence, if the real interest rate is above the rate of time preference,
today’s consumption is expensive relative to tomorrow’s, and so con-
sumption will increase over time.
1.2 Government
The government plays no active role. It gives back to consumers
the proceeds from money creation and transactions costs, which are
paid out as lump-sum transfers. The government’s constraint is thus
.  (9)
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The fact that v(mt) appears in the government’s flow constraint reflects
the assumption that v(mt) is a private cost for consumers but not a social
cost. Formally, one can think of some federal agency providing (at zero
cost) the transactions costs needed by consumers. The profits of this
federal agency are returned to households as lump-sum transfers. This
assumption is made to eliminate wealth effects associated with chang-
es in inflation, which would unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
1.3 Supply Side
Output is endogenous and assumed to be demand determined;
that is, yt = ct. The inflation rate is assumed to be predetermined at
each point in time. This formulation is meant to capture a situation in
which widespread backward-looking indexation of prices and wages
imparts a high degree of inertia to the inflation rate.3 The change in
the inflation rate is given by
, (10)
where     denotes the full-employment level of output. Equation 10 says
that the inflation rate will increase whenever it is below the rate of
money growth, t, or whenever aggregate demand exceeds full-employ-
ment output.
1.4 Equilibrium Conditions
Since bonds are so-called inside money in this economy, aggregate
bond holdings must be zero:
. (11)
Of course, substituting this equation and goods market equilibrium,
yt = ct, into the consumer’s flow constraint (equation 3) yields the
government’s budget constraint (equation 9), which is simply a man-
ifestation of Walras Law.
Finally, and for further reference, since m = M/P by defini-
tion, it follows that
. (12)
3. Widespread indexation has long characterized countries with chronic infla-
tion. See, for instance, Dornbusch and Simonsen (1987); Edwards (1991); Bruno
(1993).
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2. A FIXED MONEY GROWTH RULE
As a benchmark, consider the case in which policymakers set the
initial level and the growth rate of the nominal money supply (de-
noted by  ). Hence, equations 10 and 12 become
and (13)
. (14)
Substituting the Fisher equation and equation 5 into equation 8
produces
. (15)
Equations 13, 14, and 15 constitute a differential equation system
in t, mt, and ct, for a given value of the policy variable     . Both t and
mt are predetermined variables.
The system’s steady state is given by
, (16)
,   and (17)
. (18)
Linearizing this system around the steady state yields
.
The trace and determinant of the matrix associated with the
linear approximation are, respectively,
and (19)
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(20)
which implies that there is one positive root and two roots with
negative real part.4 Since there are two predetermined variables,
the system exhibits saddle-path stability: for given initial values of
 and m, c will adjust so as to position the system along its unique,
perfect-foresight equilibrium path.
Let i, i=1, 2, denote the two negative roots, with 1 > 2. Let hij, j =
1, 2, 3, denote the elements of the eigenvector associated with root i.




As becomes clear below, this provides a crucial piece of information
when it comes to deriving the dynamic behavior of the system.
Setting to zero the constant corresponding to the unstable root,
the solution to this dynamic system takes the form
, (23)
  and (24)
, (25)
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4. In what follows, and to simplify the exposition, it is assumed that the roots
with negative real part are real numbers. It can be checked that roots will be real
(complex) numbers when is large (small) relative to . This makes intuitive
sense, because as can be seen from equation 13, a relatively large  ensures that
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where wi, i = 1, 2, denote the constants associated with root i.
Since	2 – 1 < 0, it follows that
.
This implies that as t becomes large, inflation and real money balances
will converge to their steady-state values from the same direction. Put
differently, the dominant eigenvector ray, which is illustrated in figure
1, is positively sloped (see Calvo, 1987). Graphically, the system must
converge asymptotically to the dominant eigenvector ray. Equation 14
also indicates that when (or when ), real money balances
are falling (or rising). The corresponding directional arrows are drawn
in figure 1.
We now have all the elements needed to study how this economy
adjusts to an unanticipated and permanent fall in the monetary growth
rate. Suppose that in the initial steady state (that is, for t < 0), the
monetary growth rate is . At t = 0, policymakers announce an un-
anticipated and permanent reduction of the money growth rate from
to      , where                . In terms of figure 1, the initial high-inflation
steady state is at point A. The new steady state—with lower inflation
and higher real money balances—is at point B. Given the conditions
that must be satisfied by a convergent path, the economy must follow
the arrowed path illustrated in figure 1.5







5. It can be ruled out that starting from point A, the system will first head in a
northwestern direction. In other words, . To show this, one first must show that
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Figure 2 illustrates the time path of the main variables. The paths
of inflation and real money balances follow directly from figure 1.
Since the inflation rate is a predetermined variable, the reduction in
the rate of monetary growth implies that real money balances fall in
the early stages. Given the path of mt, the path of it follows from
equation 5. The nominal interest rate must rise early on to accommo-
date the lower level of real money balances. Since rt = it – t, the path
of rt follows from the paths of it and t.6 The fact that rt is above 
during the entire adjustment process implies that after jumping down-
ward on impact, consumption rises throughout.
6. In principle, the possibility that the slope of the path of rt changes sign more
than once cannot be ruled out. What is important, however, is that during the adjust-
ment process, rt will always be above its unique steady-state value.
Figure 2. Reduction in Money Growth Rate
A. Money growth rate B. Inflation rate
C. Real money balances D. Consumption
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The intuition behind these results is as follows. The permanent
reduction in the monetary growth rate implies that, in the new
steady state, inflation—and thus the nominal interest rate—will be
lower. Hence, real money demand in the new steady state will be
higher. How will this increase in real money balances come about?
Since the nominal money stock does not jump at t = 0 (it is a policy
variable), the only way for the economy to generate higher real
money balances is for the inflation rate to fall below the lower rate
of monetary growth,   . Inflation thus needs to undershoot its long-
run value in order for real money balances to eventually begin to
rise toward their higher steady-state value. In other words, tight
monetary policy (in the form of a sharp reduction in the monetary
growth rate) forces the economy to undergo a deflationary period.
This tight monetary policy manifests itself in high nominal and real
interest rates in the early stages of the stabilization program.
It will prove useful to derive analytically the time paths of the
nominal and real interest rates. Differentiating first-order condi-
tion 5 and recalling that                   ,  it follows that
. (26)
Along the adjustment path, the nominal interest rate thus depends
on the difference between the current inflation rate and the long-run
inflation rate (which equals ) . This already suggests that an infla-
tion target combined with an interest rate rule whereby the nomi-
nal interest rate is raised if the actual inflation rate is above the
inflation target may yield a similar dynamic path to the k-percent
money growth rule.
With regard to the real interest rate, the Fischer equation and
equations 13 and 26 can be used to obtain
. (27)
Hence, the real interest rate increases whenever inflation is above its
long-run value and falls if consumption is above the full-employment
level of output. The intuition for the latter channel is as follows: other
things being equal, when consumption is above its full-employment
level, the inflation rate is rising (recall equation 13), which implies that
the real interest rate is falling. Again, this suggests that an inflation
target combined with a real interest rate rule that responds to both
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the output gap and the gap between the current inflation rate and
an inflation target should yield similar dynamics to the k-percent
money growth rule.
3. THE NOMINAL INTEREST RATE AS AN INSTRUMENT
3.1 A Pure Interest Rate Peg
Suppose that policymakers set the nominal interest rate at a con-
stant level, . This is achieved by letting the money supply adjust to
whatever level is needed for the targeted interest rate to prevail.
It will be shown that an interest rate peg leads to a multiplicity of
equilibrium paths.
If   , it follows from first-order condition 5 that   and,
therefore, that          . Equation 10 then becomes
. (28)
Taking into account the Fisher equation, the Euler equation 8 can be
rewritten as
. (29)
Equations 28 and 29 constitute a differential equation system
in t and ct, for a given value of  At the steady state,         and
. Linearizing the system around the steady state,
.
The trace and determinant of the matrix associated with the linear
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This implies that there are two complex roots with real part
equal to zero.7 The dynamic system exhibits a vortex and is thus
unstable. For a given initial value of the inflation rate (except if it
happens to be the steady-state value), there is no value of consump-
tion that places the economy on a convergent path. All possible
values imply that the system will oscillate forever without ever
reaching the steady state. In this model, therefore, a pure nominal
interest rate peg does not provide a sensible way of conducting
monetary policy.
Intuitively, the problem lies in the fact that under a pure inter-
est rate peg, the economy loses its nominal anchor as the rate of
monetary growth passively accommodates inflation. Indeed, as made
clear by equation 28, there is no long-run value of the inflation rate
(that is, no nominal anchor) to guide the inflation rate to a specific
value. In contrast, under a k-percent money rule (recall equation
13), the rate of change of the inflation rate is affected by the differ-
ence between the current inflation rate and its long-run value.
3.2 A Nominal Interest Rate Rule with
an Inflation Target
Consider the following policy regime: policymakers announce an
inflation target, , and follow the interest rate rule
, (30)
whereby the nominal interest rate is gradually raised (reduced)
whenever the inflation rate is above its target.8 (In this setup, the
nominal interest rate is, by construction, a predetermined vari-
able.) Differentiating first-order condition 5 and using equation
30 produces
. (31)
7. The roots are given by , where z2 = –1.
8. All policy parameters are positive unless otherwise indicated.
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Combining equation 31 with equations 10 and 12 yields
. (32)
This last equation, together with equations 15 and 31, forms a
dynamic system in t, mt, and ct whose dynamic properties are qual-
itatively the same as those of the system described by equations 13,
14, and 15 for the fixed money growth rule. Thus, if at time 0, poli-
cymakers announce a reduction in the inflation target and follow
policy rule 30, the economy will follow (in qualitative terms) the
adjustment process depicted in figure 2, except for t.
Note that t is now an endogenous variable whose path is given by
. (33)
To fix ideas, note that is the inverse of the absolute value




If real money demand is of the Cagan type (that is, it exhibits a con-
stant semielasticity), then it follows from equation 33 that on impact
mt will fall by more than the inflation target if and by less
if               . In the case in which              ,             for all t, and the
system behaves exactly as it does under a fixed money growth
rule. In other words, an outside observer would not be able to tell
whether a given reduction in the long-run inflation rate was brought
about by a permanent reduction in     or by the announcement of a
lower inflation target together with interest rate rule 30.
4. THE REAL INTEREST RATE AS POLICY INSTRUMENT
4.1 A Pure Real Interest Rate Peg
Suppose that policymakers set the real interest rate at the con-
stant value     . A necessary condition for such a real interest rate peg
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to be consistent with a convergent equilibrium path is that
      . Otherwise, consumption would either increase or decrease
forever, as follows from equation 8. The peg        therefore implies
that . Hence,       for a convergent path to exist. From
equation 10,
. (34)
Recalling the Fisher equation, it then follows from equations 7 and
34 that
,
which implies that along a perfect-foresight equilibrium path,            .
Intuitively, if the monetary growth rate were above the inflation rate,
real money balances would be increasing over time. The nominal inter-
est rate would need to fall over time for money market equilibrium to
hold. Since the real interest rate is constant, this implies that the in-
flation rate would be falling over time. In contrast, if the monetary
growth rate were above the inflation rate, equation 34 indicates that
inflation must be increasing over time. The only consistent path is for
inflation to remain flat over time.
Let        . Along a perfect-foresight equilibrium path,         ,
        , and mt = L(      ). The economy is thus always in
a stationary equilibrium. This equilibrium is not uniquely determined,
however. To see this, suppose that for whatever reason, the public
came to expect that the inflation rate will be     . By the above
reasoning,              and                . Since the nominal interest rate is
higher, real money demand would be lower; that is, mt = L (          ).
The nominal money stock would fall to accommodate the lower
real money demand. In sum, policymakers will validate any infla-
tion rate expected by the public. There is nothing to tie down the
level of the constant rate of inflation.
4.2 A Real Interest Rate Rule with an Inflation Target
Consider the following policy regime: policymakers announce
an inflation target,   , and follow the real interest rate rule
. (35)
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Combining equations 7, 10, and 35 generates
Equations 8, 35, and 36 constitute a dynamic system in t, ct,
and rt. Proceeding as in the case of the fixed money growth rule,
this dynamic system may be solved by computing the dominant eigen-
vector ray. In response to an unanticipated reduction in the infla-
tion target, the system adjusts to the new steady state following
similar dynamics as in figure 2, except for the behavior of t, which
may vary over time.
5. AN EQUIVALENCE PROPOSITION
The above analysis has shown that both a nominal interest rate
rule and a real interest rate rule, in conjunction with an inflation tar-
get, will qualitatively yield the same results as a k-percent money growth
rule. I now discuss a particular case in which these three rules are
exactly the same.
Suppose that the transactions cost technology takes the form
, (37)
where   is a positive parameter.
Using equation 5, the real money demand then becomes
. (38)
This is a Cagan-type real money demand since it exhibits a constant
semielasticity:













m v m m i
i L
m












i L i L
i L i L














  169 Monetary Policy, Interest Rate Rules, and Inflation Targeting
Under such a specification, the paths for the nominal interest
rate and the real interest rate for the k-percent money growth
rule studied above are given, respectively, by
   and (40)
, (41)
as follows from equations 26, 27, and 39. Equation 40 indicates that
under a Cagan money demand, the rate of change of the nominal
interest rate is a linear function of the gap between the current
inflation rate and the long-run inflation rate (given by   ). From
equation 41, it follows that the rate of change of the real interest
rate is also a linear function of the inflation gap and, in addition, of
the gap between consumption (aggregate demand) and full-employ-
ment output. Recall also from figure 2 that neither the nominal
interest rate nor the real interest rate jump on impact (that is, at
t = 0).
Suppose now that policymakers set an inflation target,    , that
pins down the long-run inflation rate and therefore plays the role
of   . In conjunction with this inflation target, they follow interest
rate rules of the form in equations 40 and 41, whereby the nominal
interest rate and the real interest rate are changed gradually over
time in response to changes in either the inflation gap or the out-
put gap. Furthermore, suppose that policymakers set the policy
reaction coefficients equal to      for the inflation gap in the case of
the nominal interest rate rule and equal to         for the inflation
gap and     for the output gap in the case of the real interest rate
rule. Under these conditions, it follows that these two policy rules
will be exactly equivalent to the fixed money growth rule studied
above.
This equivalence result can be summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: If the transactions technology is given by equation
37, which gives rise to a Cagan money demand function (equation 38)
with semielasticity equal to , then the following three monetary
policy rules are exactly equivalent:
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(a) policymakers set a fixed money growth rule,
; (42)
(b) policymakers announce an inflation target,     (equal to     ),
and follow a nominal interest rate rule,
, (43)
where ; and
(c) policymakers announce an inflation target,     (equal to     ), and
follow a real interest rate rule,
, (44)
where and .
This policy equivalence implies that if policymakers wish to re-
duce inflation, any of the three policy regimes are formally equiva-
lent. Assuming that the model is a reasonably good description of
reality, the choice between different rules will come down to practi-
cal advantages. Several remarks are in order.
First, as one moves from the more orthodox instrument (the money
supply) to the less orthodox instrument (the real interest rate), the
rules become more complicated in the sense that more feedback mech-
anisms are required. Hence, in practice, these policy rules will be in-
creasingly complex to implement.
Second, not only is the real interest rate rule the more complicated
(as it depends on the output gap, which is clearly difficult to estimate
in practice), but it also does not have, in principle, any advantage over
the nominal interest rate. In addition, the real interest rate rule re-
quires that the real interest rate be reduced when there is excess
aggregate demand, which is the opposite of what the public may
think should be done.9 This might lead to credibility problems.
Finally, in practice, monetary authorities have mostly aban-
doned money growth rules based principally on the instability of
money demand and the problems associated with choosing between
 9. Of course, a real interest rate rule of the form in equation 35—which does not
respond to the output gap—can still deliver a qualitatively similar adjustment to the
fixed money growth rule, although it cannot replicate it exactly. Even in this case,
however, the real interest rate does not have any advantages over the nominal inter-
est rate as a policy instrument.
 
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 
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different monetary aggregates. A nominal interest rate rule avoids
this problem and therefore might be preferable. This might explain
the increasing popularity of inflation targeting regimes, of which rule
30 may be considered a particular case.
6. AVOIDING DEFLATION: ALTERNATIVE RULES
A legitimate question that may arise is why the fixed money growth
rule should be the benchmark against which other rules are com-
pared. Two factors make it the natural benchmark. First, it is the
traditional policy instrument par excellence. Second, as shown above,
it is the only instrument that can be set with no feedback rules. In
the absence of feedback rules, neither the nominal nor the real inter-
est rate can provide a nominal anchor for monetary policy.
A case might still be made for considering other possible bench-
marks. The main rationale for doing so is the fact that, as discussed
above, a fixed money growth rule represents an excessively tight mon-
etary policy stance, as it requires a prolonged period of deflation (in the
sense of the inflation rate falling below its long-run value) in order to
build real money balances (see figure 2, panel B). One may therefore
wonder whether other rules could avoid this deflationary period and
thus provide a better benchmark. Since the excessively tight mone-
tary policy is reflected in an initial fall in consumption, it seems natu-
ral to ask whether an interest rate rule that also responds to the
output gap would be capable of avoiding the deflationary period.10
6.1 A Nominal Interest Rate Rule
with Output Feedback
Suppose that instead of equation 30, the interest rate rule takes
the form:
. (45)
This rule captures policymakers’ concerns about consumption
(and thus output) falling below its full-employment level. If consumption
is below its full-employment level, the nominal interest rate is reduced.
 10. For simplicity, I consider the case in which real money demand is given by
equation 38.
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Using equations 5 and 10, together with the fact that
yields,
. (46)
Since the main purpose of the exercise is to provide an example in
which a nominal interest rate with output feedback avoids the defla-
tionary period, the analysis considers the case in which .
Equation 46 then simplifies to:
. (47)
This is a stable differential equation in	t. It follows immediately
that an unanticipated and permanent reduction in the inflation target
combined with rule 45 will cause inflation to fall monotonically over
time toward its lower steady-state value.
To solve for the whole dynamic system, combine the Fisher equa-
tion and equations 45 and 47. This generates the law of motion for
the real interest rate:
. (48)
Unlike in the k-percent money growth rule case in which      depended
negatively on excess demand (recall equation 41), here it depends posi-
tively. The intuition in this case is as follows. Excess demand does not
directly affect the change in the inflation rate, as follows from equation
47. Other things being equal, excess aggregate demand therefore leads
to an increase in the nominal interest rate—according to rule 45—and
thus in the real interest rate.
Equations 8, 47, and 48 form a differential equation system in t,
rt, and ct. Both t and rt are predetermined variables.11 Linearizing
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11. By construction it is predetermined. Since t is also a predetermined vari-
able, so is rt.
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The trace and determinant of the matrix associated with the
linear approximation are, respectively,
and
.
The system thus has two negative roots.12 Let i , i = 1, 2, denote
the two negative roots.13 Let hij, j = 1, 2, 3, denote the elements of the
eigenvector associated with root i. For i = 1, 2, it follows that
Therefore,
Setting to zero the constant corresponding to the unstable root,
the solution to this dynamic system takes the form
,   and
,
where wi, i = 1, 2, denote the constants associated with root i.
(Note that h21 = 0.) Since 1 – 2 < 0, it follows that
.












12. Since one of the negative roots is –s, it follows that the two negative roots
are real numbers.
13. The roots are . (It is assumed, with no loss of
generality, that 1 < 2.)
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This implies that as t becomes large, the real interest rate and
consumption will converge to their steady-state values from oppo-
site directions. In other words, the dominant eigenvector ray is
negatively sloped (figure 3). From equation 8, it follows that con-
sumption increases (falls) to the right (left) of rt = . The corre-
sponding directional arrows are drawn in figure 3.
Turning now to the economy’s response to a reduction in the
inflation target,     , suppose that in the initial steady state (that is, for
t < 0), the inflation target is       . (The initial steady state is denoted by point
A in figure 3.) At t = 0, policymakers announce an unanticipated and
permanent reduction of the inflation target from      to     , where .
In terms of figure 3, the steady state remains at point A. To be on a
convergent path, ct must jump down on impact to a point such as B.14
The system then follows the arrowed path back to point A.
Figure 4 illustrates the time path of the main variables. If
, the path of the monetary growth rate is given by
. (49)
H 
L H   
H 
L 
Figure 3. Dynamics in the (r, c) Plane
 14. If consumption did not jump downwards on impact, the system
would diverge in a northeastern direction. To see this notice that, if , then
. The rising real interest rate would in turn lead to
a rising path of consumption.
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Thus the money growth rate will fall on impact by less than the
inflation target. During the transition, the money growth rate must
be higher than the inflation rate (at least for some period of time) to
allow real money balances to grow over time without the need for
inflation to fall below its steady-state value. Real money balances
fall in the initial stages and increase later on (panel C), while the
nominal interest rate increases early on and falls later on (panel D).
Depending on the parameter configuration, the money growth
rate could rise on impact (as captured by the dashed path in panel
A). In that case, real money balances will grow from the very be-
ginning and the nominal interest rate will fall throughout the ad-
justment path (dashed paths in panels C and E, respectively).
Figure 4. Reduction in Inflation Target
A. Money growth rate B. Inflation rate
C. Real money balances D. Consumption




















6.2 A Second Equivalence Proposition
It follows immediately from equation 49 that in conjunction
with an inflation target, a money growth rule that responds to the
output gap would enable policymakers to reduce inflation while
avoiding a protracted deflationary period. Furthermore, a real in-
terest rate rule that takes the form given by equation 48 would
also avoid the deflationary period. A key feature of this rule is
that now the real interest rate would be raised when the economy
is overheated, whereas rule 44 implies the opposite.
This establishes another equivalence between the different pol-
icy rules and instruments, which is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: If the transactions cost technology is given by
equation 37, which gives rise to a Cagan money demand function
(equation 38) with semielasticity equal to , then the following three
monetary policy rules are exactly equivalent (under the maintained
assumption that ):
(a) policymakers announce an inflation target,  , and follow
the money growth rule,
;
 (b) policymakers announce an inflation target,  , and follow
the nominal interest rate rule,
,   and




It is still the case that the money rule is the simplest one. On the
other hand, all rules depend on the output gap, which is naturally
difficult to gauge in practice. Given the difficulties associated with money
rules, therefore, the nominal interest rate-cum-inflation target policy
regime continues to look like a very reasonable alternative to money
rules.
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7. FINAL REMARKS
This paper has established some basic equivalences among al-
ternative instruments and policy rules in the context of a closed-
economy model with sticky inflation. It has shown that a long-run
reduction in the inflation rate can be achieved with three different
rules—a k-percent money growth rule, an interest rate rule, and a
real interest rate rule—which deliver exactly the same outcome.
The money rule is the simplest, however, as it involves no feed-
back mechanisms. If policymakers wish to avoid a protracted de-
flationary period, there are also three different policy regimes that
deliver exactly the same outcome.
The goal of the analysis has been to put enough structure into the
model so as to establish some basic policy equivalences, which should
be helpful in thinking about alternative policy regimes. The main pol-
icy conclusion of the analysis is perhaps that a nominal interest rate
rule combined with an inflation target can, in principle, replicate ex-
actly the workings of a money growth rule. Taken as a normative
result, this provides strong support for using nominal interest rate
rules, given the well-known practical difficulties of controlling mone-
tary aggregates. It may explain the dramatic shift in actual policy-
making away from monetary targets and toward regimes that
essentially involve—implicitly or explicitly—an inflation target and a
nominal interest rate rule aimed at achieving that target.
How would the main conclusions of the analysis be affected by
relaxing some of the central assumptions? This is an area for future
research, but some conjectures may be made. Consider the case of
an open economy. In line with the spirit of the model, it could be
assumed that the prices of tradables goods are flexible and deter-
mined by purchasing power parity, while inflation of home goods is
sticky and determined in the same way as in the closed-economy
model. Under flexible exchange rates, such a model should gener-
ate the same results. The reason is simply that under flexible ex-
change rates, the money supply remains the main nominal anchor;
the same equivalences with interest rate rules would therefore hold.
I would thus conjecture that, to a first approximation, the results
should hold for flexible exchange rate regimes.
Under fixed or predetermined exchange rates, the nature of the
policy rules studied in the paper would need to be modified to account
for the fact that the nominal money supply is endogenous. This implies
that the nominal interest rate (and real interest rate) could jump178 Carlos Végh
on impact, in contrast to this paper’s model. One would thus need
to study interest rate rules that could include an initial discrete
change in interest rates.15 This may complicate the formal analysis,
but I see no reason to believe that it would alter the main message
of this paper.
What if the economy were subject to stochastic shocks? While
this is an extension worth addressing, conceptually it is not obvious
why it should fundamentally alter any of the main conclusions. Sup-
pose there were stochastic shocks to money demand. A k-percent
money rule would absorb such shocks by variations in nominal (and
thus real) interest rates. A nominal (or real) interest rate rule that
responded to such shocks should deliver a similar outcome. If, on the
other hand, certain types of shock were more prevalent than others,
this might affect the choice of instruments along the lines of Poole
(1970). It is unclear, however, how such considerations would affect
the present analysis, since the type of indeterminacies emphasized
by the more modern, rational-expectations literature do not depend
on the specific shocks that hit the economy.
 15. Of course, the same logic would apply to a closed-economy model in
which the real money demand also depended on consumption (which is not the
case in this model).179 Monetary Policy, Interest Rate Rules, and Inflation Targeting
APPENDIX A
Fixed Money Growth Rule
A.1 Initial Jump in Consumption
Following an unanticipated reduction in the monetary growth rate,
consumption must jump downward on impact. The proof proceeds
in three stages.
First, different elements of the eigenvectors must be signed. With no
loss of generality, let h11 = h21 = 1. From equation 22, it then follows that
, (A1)
  , and  (A2)
. (A3)
(To sign the last expression, recall that, by construction, 1 – 2 > 0).
From system 21, it follows that
  , (A4)
where i = 1, 2 .
Second, I solve for the system’s constants. The solution to the
dynamic system (given by equations 23, 24, and 25) leads to
, (A5)
,  and  (A6)
. (A7)
Equations A5 and A6 can be used to solve for 1 and 2:
  and (A8)
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0  
, (A9)
where the signs follow from equations A1, A2, and A3 and the fact
that and .
Finally, the expression for the initial jump in consumption can be
signed. Substituting equations A4, A8, and A9 into equation A7 yields
. (A10)
To sign the last expression, note that  + 1 + 2 < 0, which follows
from the fact that 1 + 2 + 3 +  = 0 (recall, from equation 19, that
the system’s trace is     ) and 3 > 0. Equation A10 implies that           .
Consumption thus jumps downward on impact (that is, at t = 0).
A.2 Sign of 0
To check that the system will not initially head in a northwestern
direction starting from point A (in terms of figure 1), it is enough to
show that  . To that effect, equation 13 can be used to show that
, (A11)
since and, as just shown, .
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